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Comments
HANGING ON BY A “TAIL”: NEW JERSEY’S 2014 EFFORT
TO LEGALIZE SPORTS GAMBLING STAYS
ALIVE IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
New Jersey is no stranger to this situation; this is the second
time in two years that New Jersey legislators and state sports officials
(collectively “the New Jersey parties”) have faced the NCAA, the
NFL, the NHL, the NBA, and MLB (collectively the “Sports
Leagues”) in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.1  New Jersey has
been on a quest to legalize sports gambling in the state for over five
years.2  According to one estimate, legalized sports betting could
generate as much as $120 million in tax revenue.3  The Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), a federal statute en-
acted in 1992 prohibiting state-sponsored sports gambling, is the
primary obstacle preventing New Jersey legislators from successfully
enacting a legalized sports gambling scheme in the state.4
After the Third Circuit held that New Jersey’s 2012 Sports Wa-
gering Law (the “2012 Law”) violated PASPA in NCAA v. Governor of
New Jersey (“Christie I”),5 New Jersey legislators enacted a new sports
betting law in October 2014 (the “2014 Law”).6  In an attempt to
1. See generally NCAA v. Gov. of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) [hereinafter
Christie I] (declaring PASPA constitutional and that it preempts 2012 Law), cert.
denied sub nom. Christie v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014); NCAA v. Gov. of N.J., 799
F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Christie II] (holding PASPA preempts 2014
Law), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated Order Sur Petitions for Rehearing En
Banc, Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
2. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–34, NCAA v. Gov. of N.J., 799 F.3d
259 (3d Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569) [hereinafter Transcript of
Oral Argument, Christie II] (discussing legislative intent behind 2014 Law).
3. See James C. W. Goodall, Note, Bringing Down the House: An Examination of
the Law and Policy Underpinning the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of
1992, 67 RUTGERS L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2015) (introducing economic implications
of legalized sports betting in New Jersey).
4. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-
3704 (2006); see Christie II, 799 F.3d at 265 (“PASPA has clearly stymied New
Jersey’s attempts to revive its casinos and racetracks and provide jobs for its
workforce.”).
5. 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-1 to 5:12A-4
(West 2012) (repealed 2014) (outlining 2012 Law).
6. See Christie II, 799 F.3d at 262–63 (summarizing Christie I litigation and en-
actment of 2014 Law); see also Act of Oct. 17, 2014, S.B. 2460, 216th Leg., 2014 NJ
(481)
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circumvent PASPA, New Jersey legislators crafted the 2014 Law to
partially repeal the state’s sports betting laws.7  Legislators chose
their words carefully, mirroring the language of PASPA and quot-
ing the Third Circuit opinion of Christie I in the signing statement
to demonstrate the legality of the bill.8  The Sports Leagues sued
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and other state gaming offi-
cials, similar to when New Jersey enacted the 2012 Law, in NCAA v.
Governor of New Jersey9 (“Christie II”).10  After New Jersey legislators
enacted the 2014 Law, the Sports Leagues sought an injunction and
claimed PASPA preempted the law.11 Christie I involved the consti-
tutionality of PASPA itself, whereas Christie II analyzed the language
of the 2014 Law to determine whether it constituted a repeal or
authorization of state-sanctioned sports betting.12  After the Third
Circuit declared that the 2014 Law violated PASPA, the New Jersey
parties filed for a rehearing en banc.13  The Third Circuit granted
the rehearing and vacated the judgment of Christie II.14
This article argues the Third Circuit’s decision in Christie II cor-
rectly held the 2014 Law allows what PASPA prohibits.15  The Third
Circuit still seems unsure of what state regulation PASPA would per-
mit, and the New Jersey Parties reintroduced arguments of PASPA’s
unconstitutionality at the rehearing en banc.16  The court should
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 62 (N.J. 2014) (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12A-7 to 5:12A-9
(West 2014)) (outlining 2014 Law).
7. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12A-7 (using specific language of PASPA in 2014
Law).
8. See S.B. 2460 (explaining authority on which 2014 Law is consistent with
PASPA).
9. 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015).
10. See id. at 262–63 (summarizing Christie I legislation and procedural history
of Christie II).
11. See id. at 263 (explaining procedural history of case).
12. See id. at 263, 265–66 (declaring Christie I constitutional analysis of PASPA
as law of Third Circuit and that 2014 Law constitutes “authorization” despite statu-
tory language).
13. See generally Petition for Rehearing and/or Rehearing En Banc for Appel-
lants Christopher J. Christie, David L. Rebuck, and Frank Zanzuccki, NCAA v. Gov.
of N.J., 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-4546) (requesting rehearing because
of inconsistencies between Christie I and Christie II).
14. See Order Sur Petitions for Rehearing En Banc, NCAA v. Gov. of N.J., 799
F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569) [hereinafter Order
Granting Rehearing En Banc] (granting rehearing en banc of Christie II).  The
rehearing en banc took place on February 17, 2016.  The Third Circuit had not
published an opinion at the time of publication.
15. For an analysis on the court’s holding in Christie I and Christie II, see infra
notes 86–110 and 118–41 and accompanying text.
16. See Rehearing En Banc Oral Argument at 16:31, NCAA v. Gov. of N.J.,
Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569 (3d Cir. Feb. 17, 2016), available at http://
www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/14-4546NCAAv.GovernoroftheState
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readdress the constitutionality of PASPA in their forthcoming opin-
ion, most crucially the equal sovereignty doctrine.17  Part II details
the history of PASPA’s enactment and outlines previous challenges
to the constitutionality and statutory interpretation of the statute.18
Part III compares the holdings of Christie I and Christie II, outlining
potential unresolved issues the court may address en banc.19  Part
IV discusses the implications of the Third Circuit’s impending deci-
sion en banc on sports betting in New Jersey.20  Part V summarizes
these arguments.21
II. BACKGROUND
A. Congressional Intent Behind PASPA
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act prohibits
States from “sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing], promot[ing],
licens[ing] or authoriz[ing] by law or compact . . . [a] betting, gam-
bling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly, . . . [on]
competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes par-
ticipate.”22  The Senate enacted this statute after considering the
“moral erosion” sports gambling causes nationwide, erosion that
creates a domino effect of States who cannot “resist the lure” when
another state legalizes sports gambling.23  Gambling on sports af-
fects the moral values of American society, including fair competi-
tion and a sense of teamwork.24  The Senate was also concerned
with the effects of gambling on young people, urging that PASPA
should be enacted because the government cannot condone the
corruption of America’s youth.25
The Senate enacted PASPA to stop states from sanctioning
sports gambling, believing that a prohibition would uphold the in-
tegrity of professional sports and stop the spread of illegal mar-
ofNJetal.mp3 [hereinafter Rehearing En Banc Oral Argument] (arguing PASPA
commandeers New Jersey by telling state legislators how to regulate sports gam-
bling); see also id. at 40:54 (failing to find, according to one judge, any case law to
illustrate what precisely “authorize by law” means within PASPA).
17. For an analysis on the constitutional issues of PASPA, see infra notes
152–193 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 22–151 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 152–93 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 194–221 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 222–25 and accompanying text.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006).
23. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1992) (discussing proposed statute on sports
gambling).
24. See id. (providing testimony of National Football League commissioner).
25. See id. (discussing intent behind PASPA).
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kets.26  The federal interest in “protecting sports from corruption”
is “implicit in existing Federal law.”27  The Senate Committee did
not believe that sports gambling could be exempt from regulation
or taxation simply because it could provide revenue for states.28
The Committee felt that states profiting from a “socially destruc-
tive” activity crosses into the realm of illegality and immorality.29
Despite these concerns, the provisions of PASPA did not apply
to all fifty states.30  PASPA included a grandfathering clause that
exempted any state that enacted a sports gambling scheme between
January 1, 1976 and August 31, 1990.31  Nevada, Delaware, Oregon,
and Montana already had sports lotteries in place; these states re-
main unaffected by the provisions of PASPA.32  New Jersey was
given one year from PASPA’s enactment to choose whether to li-
cense sports gambling in Atlantic City, an exception of which the
state did not avail itself.33
B. Constitutional Issues Surrounding PASPA
1. Governmental Regulation of Sports Gambling and the Anti-
Commandeering Doctrine
The Framers of the Constitution deliberately gave “Congress
the power to regulate individuals, [but] not the States.”34  Although
Congress has the authority to regulate activities related to the States
and their citizens, Congress cannot dictate how a state must regu-
26. See id. (discussing history of PASPA’s enactment).
27. See id. at 6–7 (citing laws addressing bribery in sports contests, 18 U.S.C.
§ 224, (1994) and exceptions relating to certain advertisements and other informa-
tion and to State-conducted lotteries, 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988)).
28. See id. at 7 (arguing “other destructive activities” that provide revenue may
legally be regulated or taxed).
29. See id. at 7 (feeling compelled to “draw a line between legal and illegal,
right and wrong).  However, it is important to note that the court in Christie II
declined to consider the legislative intent of PASPA in determining the validity of
the 2014 Law.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, Christie II, supra note 2, at 37
(addressing no need to look beyond statutory language).
30. See Joshua Winneker, Ira Sprotzer & Lindsay Demery, Sports Gambling and
the Expanded Sovereignty Doctrine, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 38, 40 (2013) (introduc-
ing PASPA grandfathering clause).  Specifically, the Senate did not want to harm
Nevada’s economy and thus allowed the state to be exempt. See Christie I, 730 F.3d
208, 216–17 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing history of PASPA’s enactment), cert. denied
sub nom. Christie v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
31. See 28 USC § 3704(a)(1)–(2) (1992) (outlining PASPA applicability).
32. See Winneker et al., supra note 30, at 40–43 (summarizing sports gambling
operations in Nevada, Delaware, Montana, and Oregon).
33. See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 216 (discussing history of PASPA’s enactment).
34. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (outlining consti-
tutional history of anti-commandeering doctrine).
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late these activities.35  The Third Circuit classifies sports gambling
as an activity which substantially affects interstate commerce; there-
fore, it may be regulated by Congress under the Commerce
Clause.36
Congressional acts are in violation of the anti-commandeering
doctrine when the act does not allow the states to choose how to
regulate an activity or when the act forces states to choose between
two unconstitutional options.37 New York v. United States38 and Printz
v. United States39 are the only two cases in which the United States
Supreme Court struck down laws for violation of the anti-comman-
deering doctrine.40  In New York, the Supreme Court struck down a
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act requiring a
state government to take ownership of radioactive waste or regulate
the removal of radioactive waste according to Congress’ program.41
The states were left with no choice; whether they took title of the
waste or Congress took ownership, the states were forced to adhere
to the federal program and follow Congress’ instructions.42  In
35. See id. at 162 (explaining tenets of anti-commandeering doctrine).
36. See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 225 (citing Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005))
(declaring sports gambling “quintessentially economic” activity).  The Christie I
court in the Third Circuit determined that sports gambling activities substantially
influenced interstate market conditions to be regulated by Congress.  See id. (de-
claring regulation of sports gambling within Congressional authority); cf United
States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1972) (deferring to Congressional report
that illegal gambling affects interstate commerce); United States v. Ceraso, 467
F.2d 653, 658 (3d Cir. 1972) (explaining that gambling negatively impacts busi-
nesses, labor unions, and democratic processes).
37. See New York, 505 U.S. at 175–76 (explaining that Congress can neither
directly regulate state governments nor regulate state activities without Constitu-
tional authority).
38. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
39. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
40. See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 229 (discussing history of anti-commandeering
doctrine in Supreme Court).  The discussion of whether states should act as agents
of Congress began before the Constitution was written. See New York, 505 U.S. at
163 (providing background information on anti-commandeering doctrine).  The
first time a commandeering issue reached the Supreme Court was not until the
1970s when the Environmental Protection Agency required states to employ cer-
tain programs such as designated carpool lanes and auto emissions testing; how-
ever, the Supreme Court did not define any principles in that case because the
Government had invalidated the controversial provisions by the time the case
reached the Court. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925 (discussing EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99
(1977)).  After upholding the constitutionality of the statutes at issue in Hodel v.
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), the Court found
the statute at issue in New York v. United States to be the first “that unambiguously
required the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” See
Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-26 (discussing Supreme Court precedent regarding anti-
commandeering).
41. See New York, 505 U.S. at 175 (describing statute at issue).
42. See id. at 176 (reasoning statute commandeers states).
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Printz, The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act required state
and local law enforcement officers to perform background checks
on those who attempted to purchase a handgun.43  This law went
beyond Congress’ authority, as Congress could not directly regulate
the duties of a state officer in order to enforce a federal regulatory
program.44  Therefore, the Act was held unconstitutional.45
Conversely, certain schemes do not violate the anti-comman-
deering principle if states are given a choice between two or more
actions.46  In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Associa-
tion47 the Court established that Congress may require states to
comply with federal standards in an area that would otherwise be
preempted.48  At issue in Hodel was a federal statute governing coal
mining standards.49  States could propose a regulatory program
consistent with the federal statute’s requirements; the federal gov-
ernment would regulate the program within a state if the state did
not propose a system.50  The Court emphasized that states were not
compelled to establish a regulatory system for coal mining.51  Con-
gress allowed states to choose whether the state or federal govern-
ment would bear the burden of establishing the coal mining
system.52
Similarly, in FERC v. Mississippi,53 the Supreme Court upheld a
law giving states two choices: comply with federal regulations re-
garding energy efficiency standards or forego the activity alto-
gether.54  The Court recognized that this was a difficult situation, a
sentiment that the Third Circuit would later echo in Christie I re-
garding PASPA.55  Nevertheless, providing a state with two choices
43. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902 (discussing statute at issue).
44. See id. at 935 (reiterating violation of anti-commandeering doctrine).
45. See id. (declaring statute violates anti-commandeering doctrine).
46. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
47. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
48. See id. at 290–91 (holding that Congress may proscribe states to regulate
private activity affecting interstate commerce).
49. See id. at 268 (outlining relevant sections of Surface Coal Mining Act).
50. See id. at 268–69 (describing regulatory program proscribed in statute).
51. See id. at 288 (illustrating how states have choice and are not comman-
deered by statute).
52. See id. (describing why statue does not commandeer states).  Congress
could have constitutionally enacted a statute prohibiting any state regulation of
surface coal mining. See id. at 290 (postulating other constitutionally valid
legislation).
53. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
54. See id. at 749–50 (discussing choice statute provides to states).
55. See id. at 766 (conceding state choice provided by statute is not easy to
make).  The Third Circuit in Christie I agreed that the choice between maintaining
6
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did not commandeer them into enacting a federal regulatory
program.56
2. Shelby County and Equal Sovereignty
According to the equal sovereignty principle, states enjoy the
power to exercise their constitutional rights equally.57  However, in
extraordinary circumstances Congress may regulate an activity of
one state differently than in other states.58  In Christie I and Christie
II, the New Jersey parties heavily relied on a recent Supreme Court
case regarding the equal sovereignty principle.59  In Shelby County,
Alabama v. Holder60 an Alabama county challenged the constitution-
ality of two requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
applied to only nine states.61  The first, called the coverage formula,
defined voting jurisdictions only within certain states in an attempt
to eliminate racial discrimination in voting.62  The second, known
as the preclearance requirement, mandated that those jurisdictions
defined under the coverage formula seek federal approval of any
changes to election laws within those specific jurisdictions.63  Be-
cause these two provisions only applied to jurisdictions within nine
states, and any other jurisdiction in the country could change vot-
ing laws without federal approval, the Alabama county plaintiffs ar-
gued they both violate the doctrine of equal sovereignty.64  The
Court did not issue a holding on the preclearance requirement,
sports prohibitions and repealing them entirely was not easy, but this did not mean
that PASPA gave states no choice at all. See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 233 (3d Cir.
2013) (declaring PASPA does not commandeer states), cert. denied sub nom. Christie
v. NCAA 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
56. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 769–70 (upholding statute’s constitutionality).
57. See Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (discussing
importance of avoiding disparate treatment among states).
58. See id. at 2624 (defining scope of Congressional authority in regulating
state activities).
59. See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 237–38 (describing New Jersey’s argument that
PASPA violates equal sovereignty similar to Voting Rights Act).
60. 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
61. See id. at 2624 (describing effect of statute).
62. See id. at 2619–20 (detailing history of coverage formula).  The coverage
formula considered factors such as jurisdictions exhibiting a low voter registration,
low voter turnout, and jurisdictions requiring tests (such as literacy tests) for voter
eligibility. See id. at 2620 (summarizing rationale for enacting coverage formula).
63. See id. (explaining preclearance requirement was necessary to reinforce
Act’s goal of reducing racial discrimination in voting).
64. See id. at 2621–22 (describing history of case).
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although a concurring opinion argued it should have been held
unconstitutional.65
The Court held that the coverage formula was unconstitutional
for violating the equal sovereignty principle. 66  At the time of the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act, Congress had justifiably tai-
lored the coverage formula to identify areas of the country where
racial discrimination in voting occurred.67  However, the formula
does not accurately reflect the conditions of those jurisdictions to-
day; therefore, the coverage formula would be an irrational basis on
which to single out certain states and violate the principle of equal
sovereignty among the states.68
C. Pre-Christie I and II Constitutional and Statutory
Interpretation Challenges to PASPA
Although a court did not rule on the constitutionality of
PASPA until Christie I, the statute was challenged on constitutional
grounds twice before the Sports Leagues sued to enjoin New
Jersey’s 2012 Law.69  Both cases were brought in the District Court
of New Jersey, and both cases were ultimately dismissed for lack of
standing.70  The plaintiffs in these cases argued that PASPA violated
constitutional provisions including the Commerce Clause, the
Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Equal Pro-
65. See id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that unprecedented na-
ture of preclearance requirement is unjustifiable and Court’s refusal to issue hold-
ing further illustrates this).
66. See id. at 2630–31 (examining lack of relation between today’s standards
and those of society when Voting Rights Act coverage formula was enacted).
67. See id. at 2625 (summarizing Court’s prior analysis of coverage formula in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)).
68. See id. at 2625–27, 2631– 32 (holding coverage formula unconstitutional).
69. See Joshua M. Peles, Note, NCAA v. N.J.: New Jersey Rolls the Dice on a Tenth
Amendment Challenge to the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 22 MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 149, 160 (2015) (describing challenges to PASPA prior to Christie I).
70. See Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, No. 09-1301
(GEB), 2011 WL 802106, at *5–8 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011) (holding nonprofit elec-
tronic gaming website, New Jersey Horsemen’s Associations, and state senators did
not satisfy injury requirement for standing to challenge PASPA); Flagler v. U.S.
Atty for the Dist. of N.J., No. 06-3699 (JAG), 2007 WL 2814657, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept.
25, 2007) (holding New Jersey citizen did not establish injury in fact for standing
to challenge PASPA).  The court in Interactive Media articulated that only a state,
not legislators, would be able to bring a Tenth Amendment challenge to PASPA
because state regulation of sports gambling affects “state sovereignty, not legislative
sovereignty.” See Interactive Media, 2011 WL 802106, at *10; see also Peles, supra note
69, at 160–61 (summarizing holdings of Interactive Media and Flagler).
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tection Clause.71  However, by dismissing the cases, the courts were
not required to determine the constitutionality of PASPA.72
Furthermore, challenges to the language and statutory inter-
pretation of PASPA reached the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
only once before Christie I and Christie II. 73  While Christie II ana-
lyzed the construction of the statute and the meaning of the word
“authorize,” Office of the Commissioner of Baseball v. Markell74 defined
the parameters of PASPA’s grandfathering provision.75  The ex-
isting sports lotteries in Delaware at the time of PASPA’s enactment
only involved multi-game schemes on NFL teams.76  Therefore, the
grandfathering clause of PASPA did not allow the establishment of
new types of gambling schemes, such as single-game sports betting
of any kind or multi-game schemes on any league other than the
NFL.77  The exemption given to Delaware meant that its sports
gambling scheme must not be substantially different from its
scheme that existed at the time of PASPA’s enactment.78
D. New Jersey’s 2012 and 2014 Laws and Subsequent Litigation
1. The 2012 Law
Legalizing sports gambling within New Jersey’s borders has
been a legislative priority for the past decade.79  In 2011, New Jersey
voters approved a referendum to amend the state constitution and
71. See Interactive Media, 2011 WL 802106, at *2 (outlining plaintiff’s constitu-
tional claims against PASPA); Flagler, 2007 WL 2814657, at *1 (discussing Tenth
Amendment and Commerce Clause claims and rules for standing).
72. See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 216 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Christie
v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (stating Christie I is first case analyzing constitu-
tionality of PASPA).
73. See id. (declaring Markell as only court of appeals case before Christie I
decided under PASPA).
74. 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009).
75. See id. at 304 (analyzing definition of “conducted” with regard to sports
betting scheme).  In interpreting PASPA, the court considered the statute unam-
biguous in its objective to prohibit state-sponsored sports gambling. See id. at 303
(discussing obvious intent of PASPA).  For a discussion on PASPA’s grandfathering
clause, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
76. See id. at 300 (explaining Delaware lotteries before 1992).
77. See id. at 304 (discussing case holding).  Also called a parlay lottery, a
multi-game gambling scheme “ask[s] bettors to correctly choose the winners of two
or more sports contests” or a combination of over/under bets. See id. at 304 n.1.
78. See id. at 303 (explaining scope of PASPA’s exemption).
79. See Christie II, 799 F.3d at 261–62 (describing 2010 New Jersey referen-
dum).  The 2014 Law was New Jersey’s fourth attempt to legalize sports gambling
since its constitutional referendum in 2010. See Transcript of Oral Argument,
Christie II, supra note 2, at 32 (discussing legislative intent enacting 2014 Law).
9
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legalize sports gambling within the state.80  This referendum was in
direct response to the closing of many Atlantic City casinos, in light
of the recent economic downturn.81  Specifically, this amendment
would allow the state legislature to “authorize by law wagering . . .
on the results of any professional, college, or amateur sport or ath-
letic event.”82  New Jersey subsequently enacted the 2012 Law al-
lowing state authorities to authorize sports gambling in racetracks,
sports wagering lounges, and casinos.83  The law provided guide-
lines for operating sports pools, including a provision regarding eli-
gible candidates from whom operators may accept bets and
licensing requirements.84  The 2012 Law also gave the Division of
Gambling Enforcement the right to regulate sports wagering in the
same manner in which they currently regulate other casino games,
in addition to the right to “adopt a similar regulatory framework”,
as other states that allow sports gambling.85
2. Christie I
The Sports Leagues brought suit in Christie I, arguing the 2012
Law violated PASPA and sought an injunction of the law’s enforce-
ment.86  The New Jersey parties argued the leagues lacked standing
and that PASPA violated two tenets of the Tenth Amendment: the
“anti-commandeering doctrine” and the “equal sovereignty doc-
trine.”87  After determining the leagues had standing, the New
Jersey District Court asked the United States to intervene when ad-
dressing the constitutionality issues of PASPA.88  The District Court
80. See NCAA v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 493 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated, reh’g en banc granted
(3d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter NCAA] (discussing history of New Jersey’s efforts to
legalize sports gambling).
81. See Erik Brady, Sports Gambling in New Jersey Not Money in the Bank, USA
TODAY (Sep. 11, 2014, 8:06 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2014/
09/11/new-jersey-sports-gambling-betting-chris-christie/15478405/ (outlining de-
cision to enact 2012 Law).
82. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2(D), (F) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2014
amendments) (allowing authorizations to wager at casinos, gambling houses, and
racetracks).
83. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-1 to 5:12A-4 (West 2012) (repealed 2014); see
also Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir. 2013), cert denied sub nom. Christie v.
NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (explaining scheme of 2012 law).
84. See § 5:12A-2 (describing regulatory sports betting scheme).
85. See id.
86. See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 214–15 (describing procedural history of case).
87. See id. at 214 (describing procedural history of case).
88. See id. at 217 (describing procedural history of case).  Under federal law,
any United States court may ask the United States to address the constitutionality
of a Congressional Act in a suit to which the United States is not a party. See 28
U.S.C. § 2403.
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granted summary judgment in favor of the leagues and enjoined
enforcement of the 2012 Law.89  The New Jersey parties appealed
to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.90
When it reached the Third Circuit, Christie I was the first case
within the circuit to address the constitutionality of PASPA.91  The
Third Circuit held that PASPA does not commandeer the states be-
cause it does not require states to enact any laws or maintain ex-
isting laws.92  Distinguishing PASPA from other statutes deemed to
be in violation of the anti-commandeering principle in cases such
as New York and Printz, the court reasoned that PASPA “does not
require or coerce states to do” anything.93  Rather, PASPA only pro-
hibits an affirmative authorization by law of State-sponsored sports
gambling.94
Moreover, the court determined that PASPA provides a state
with two choices: repeal the existing sports gambling ban or retain
a complete ban on sports gambling.95  Simply put, the states could
ignore PASPA entirely and refrain from enacting any legislation re-
garding sports gambling.96  If a state retains the complete ban, the
state has the discretion to “decide how much of a law enforcement
priority it wants to make of sports gambling, or what the exact con-
tours of the prohibition will be.”97  Furthermore, the fact that
PASPA may present states with a difficult choice between two op-
tions does not mean that the statute is unconstitutional; the fact
that the states have two options means PASPA does not force the
states into doing only one course of action.98
The Third Circuit also rejected the New Jersey parties’ argu-
ment that PASPA violated the equal sovereignty principle.99  The
New Jersey parties hoped to prevail based on the Supreme Court’s
holding of Shelby County, in which the Court found a requirement
89. See id. at 214–15 (describing procedural history of case).
90. See id. at 217 (describing procedural history of case).
91. See id. at 216 (discussing history of litigation surrounding PASPA).
92. See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 227, 235 (upholding constitutionality of PASPA).
93. See id. at 231 (comparing PASPA to federal statutes held in violation of
anti-commandeering principle).
94. See id. at 232 (discussing prohibition versus affirmative authorization).
95. See id. at 233 (defining constitutional options PASPA offers to states).
96. See id. (deeming PASPA as consistent with anti-commandeering
principle).
97. Id.  This is the exact language legislators included in the 2014 Law signing
statement as evidence that the Third Circuit believed a partial repeal of sports
gambling laws was permissible under PASPA. See infra note 117 and accompanying
text.
98. See id. at 233 (analyzing constitutionality of PASPA).
99. See id. at 239 (rejecting argument PASPA is unconstitutional).
11
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provision of the Voting Rights Act in violation of the equal sover-
eignty principle.100  The Third Circuit noted that election proce-
dures are “not of the same nature” as gambling, and that the
Commerce Clause does not guarantee that gambling regulations
should be applied uniformly among the states. 101
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Thomas Vanaskie agreed that
PASPA did not violate the equal sovereignty principle, but went on
to argue that PASPA unconstitutionally forced states to regulate
sports gambling in the proscribed way.102  The dissent draws upon
an example from the New York opinion that although Congress has
the power to regulate interstate commerce, it may not police the
manner in which state governments regulate interstate com-
merce.103 Yet, as Judge Vanaskie pointed out, PASPA does exactly
this.104  Sports gambling is a facet of interstate commerce, and
PASPA compels the manner in which states must regulate it.105
There is no difference between the statute being crafted as a prohi-
bition or an affirmative command; either statute would comman-
deer the states.106  Furthermore, the effect of PASPA does not fall
within one of the categories upheld by the Supreme Court as a le-
gitimate Congressional regulation of interstate commerce.107
PASPA fails to regulate the activity itself to provide a policy solution,
regulate a state activity related to interstate commerce, or en-
courage state regulation of an activity.108
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately decided PASPA
was constitutional and that it preempted the 2012 Law.109  Follow-
ing this decision, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.110
100. See id. at 237–38 (explaining New Jersey parties’ arguments).
101. See id. at 238 (clarifying gambling may be regulated by Congress).
102. See id. at 241 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (arguing PASPA violates anti-com-
mandeering doctrine).
103. See id. at 245 (demonstrating Supreme Court precedent supporting
PASPA’s unconstitutionality).
104. See id. (arguing PASPA directly regulates states).
105. See id. (supporting argument that PASPA violates anti-commandeering
doctrine).
106. See id. at 251 (criticizing majority’s argument that PASPA is constitutional
because statute is affirmative mandate rather than prohibition).
107. See id. at 245 (contrasting PASPA with examples from Supreme Court
cases of constitutionally permissible regulations.)
108. See id. (contrasting PASPA with examples from Supreme Court cases of
constitutionally permissible regulations).
109. See id. at 240–41 (holding PASPA did not violate anti-commandeering
doctrine or equal sovereignty),
110. See Christie v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (denying petition for writ of
certiorari in Christie I).
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3. “You Meant What You Said and You said What You Meant and
We Followed Your Guidance 100 Percent”:111 The 2014 Law
In October 2014, in response to the Third Circuit opinion in
Christie I, the New Jersey State Senate proposed and passed a new
bill related to sports wagering, which Governor Christie signed into
law.112  The 2014 Law partially repealed permits, licenses, and au-
thorizations concerning “wagers on professional, collegiate, or ama-
teur sport contests or athletic events.”113  The law allowed persons
twenty-one years of age and older to legally gamble at New Jersey
racetracks and casinos; however, they could not bet on collegiate
sporting events either taking place in New Jersey or played by New
Jersey collegiate teams.114
The New Jersey legislature intentionally attempted to circum-
vent PASPA by using language mirroring that of PASPA, such as,
“[t]he provisions of this act. . . are not intended . . . as causing the
State to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize
by law . . . the placement or acceptance of any wager on any profes-
sional, collegiate, or amateur sport contest or athletic event.”115
Furthermore, in a statement accompanying the law, the governor
stated that the “bill implements the decision of [the Third Circuit
in Christie I],” directly quoting parts of the opinion as well as the
United States’ Brief in Opposition to Petitions for Writ of Certio-
rari, stating that “New Jersey is free to repeal those state-law prohibi-
tions [against sports gambling adopted prior to PASPA] . . . in whole
or in part.”116  The statement also declared that “the Third Circuit
does ‘not read PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from repealing its ban
on sports wagering,’ and ‘it is left up to each state to decide how
much of a law enforcement priority it wants to make of sports gam-
111. Transcript of Oral Argument, Christie II, supra note 2, at 32 (quoting DR.
SEUSS, HORTON HEARS A WHO!) (illustrating New Jersey legislators’ belief that 2014
Law was consistent with Christie I holding).
112. See NCAA, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 494 (D.N.J. 2014) (discussing enactment
of 2014 Law), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015),
vacated, reh’g en banc granted Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
113. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-7 (West 2014).
114. See NCAA, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 491 (explaining provisions of 2014 Law).
115. Act of Oct. 17, 2014, S.B. 2460, 216th Leg., 2014 NJ Sess. Law Serv. Ch.
62 (N.J. 2014) (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12A-7 to 5:12A-9 (West 2014)); see
also NCAA, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 495 (“The legislative statement immediately following
the 2014 Law provides that it implements the Third Circuit’s decision in Christie
I.”).
116. S.B. 2460 (quoting Brief to the Supreme Court in Opposition to Peti-
tions for Writs of Certiorari, to the Supreme Court in Opposition to Petitions for
Writs of Certiorari at 11, Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Nos. 13-967, 13-
979, 13-980) (emphasis in original)).
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bling, or what the exact contours of the prohibition will be,’” quoting lan-
guage directly from Christie I to illustrate that the 2014 Law was
consistent with the Third Circuit’s interpretation of PASPA.117
4. Christie II
Upon the enactment of the 2014 Law, the Sports Leagues from
the Christie I litigation filed suit to enjoin the enforcement of the
2014 Law.118  The New Jersey parties did not challenge the constitu-
tionality of PASPA again, instead arguing that the 2014 Law is a
partial repeal of the state’s sports gambling prohibitions and not an
authorization of sports gambling by the state.119  Because the Chris-
tie I opinion mentioned that PASPA allows a state to “repeal” ex-
isting laws, and PASPA specifically prohibits the “authoriz[ation]”
of wagering schemes, the New Jersey parties argued the 2014 Law
was in compliance with both PASPA and the decision of Christie I.120
The District Court for the District of New Jersey declared the 2014
Law violated PASPA, and the New Jersey parties appealed to the
Third Circuit.121
A three-judge panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed that the 2014 Law violated PASPA.122  The majority believed
117. See NCAA, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 495 (quoting S.B. 2460) (emphasis in
original).
118. See id. at 490–91 (discussing procedural history of case).  The five leagues
consisted of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the National
Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL), the National
Hockey League (NHL), and Major League Baseball (MLB). See Christie II, 799 F.3d
259, 272 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated, reh’g en banc granted Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-
4569 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).  These were the same plaintiffs as in Christie I. See
Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir. 2013) (describing procedural history of case),
cert denied sub nom. Christie v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).  Listed as defendants
in the litigation are the governor of New Jersey, the Director the New Jersey Divi-
sion of Gaming Enforcement and Assistant Attorney General of the State of New
Jersey, the Executive Director of the New Jersey Racing Commission, the New
Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association, Inc. (NJTHA), the Speaker of the
New Jersey General Assembly, the President of the New Jersey Senate, and the New
Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority. Id.
119. See Christie II, 799 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2015) (describing procedural
history of case), vacated, reh’g en banc granted Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569 (3d
Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
120. See id. (summarizing New Jersey parties’ argument).
121. See id. at 263–64 (discussing procedural history of case).
122. See id. at 264 (discussing holding of case).  The District Court said that
the 2014 Law was a “novel” attempt to create a “roadmap around PASPA.” NCAA,
61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 492 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Gov. of N.J., 799 F.3d
259 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated, reh’g en banc granted Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569 (3d
Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).  The court also recognized that New Jersey’s aim in passing the
law was to bolster its economy and provide jobs for its citizens, and that PASPA
provided an obvious roadblock in achieving this goal. See Christie II, 799 F.3d at
265 (“PASPA has clearly stymied New Jersey’s attempts to revive its casinos and
14
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that the implications of the 2014 Law if put into effect would
amount to an authorization of sports gambling, one of the six ac-
tions PASPA specifically prohibits.123  Even if New Jersey’s sports
betting laws were partially repealed, remaining laws declare sports
betting illegal.124  The repealed laws, therefore, would permit ille-
gal conduct.125  However, if no laws were in place prohibiting sports
betting, then the New Jersey government would not be “authoriz-
ing,” “licensing,” or “sponsoring” anything related to sports gam-
bling.126  This echoes the Christie I court’s interpretation of PASPA,
which provides the states with an option of completely repealing
sports wagering laws.127  The 2014 Law provided specific instruc-
tions on who may legally bet on which sporting events and where;
therefore, the law constituted an authorization, not a repeal as the
statutory language suggested.128
Although not explicitly mentioned in the opinion, the court
quickly pointed out the state-sponsored nature of the 2014 Law at
oral argument, further evidence that the 2014 Law’s violation of
PASPA.129  The 2014 Law only applies within casinos, gambling
houses, and running or harness horse racetracks.130  These venues
require licenses given by the state to operate; therefore, the 2014
Law would allow legalized betting only in venues that have some
form of state oversight.131  Broadening the power of a license is con-
racetracks and provide jobs for its workforce.”).  However, the court relied on its
language from Christie I, reiterating that the role of the court is not to evaluate the
“wisdom of PASPA” and “usurp Congress’ role simply because PASPA may have
become an unpopular law.” See id.
123. See Christie II, 799 F.3d at 265 (reasoning 2014 Law violates PASPA).  This
is not the same analysis employed by the District Court, which held that the 2014
Law violated PASPA because the state law was preempted by the federal statute. See
NCAA, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 505 (reiterating Third Circuit analysis on preemption and
anti-commandeering principles in Christie I).
124. See Christie II, 799 F.3d at 265–66 (reasoning 2014 Law is authorization
rather than repeal).
125. See id. (reasoning 2014 Law is authorization rather than repeal).
126. See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 232 (3d Cir. 2013) (describing options PASPA
provides to states), cert denied sub nom. Christie v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
127. See Christie II, 799 F.3d at 265–66 (reasoning that partial repeal is actually
authorization by permitting illegal conduct).
128. See id. (reasoning 2014 Law authorizes sports gambling).
129. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Christie II, supra note 2, at 19–23 (call-
ing into question New Jersey’s choice to only allow sports betting in venues with
existing gambling licenses).
130. See N.J. STAT ANN. § 5:12A-7 (West 2015) (listing where statute applies).
131. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Christie II, supra note 2, at 31 (noting by
court state involvement if 2014 Law enacted).  The attorney for the New Jersey
legislators argued that the state would have no interest in the sports gambling ac-
tivities, but conceded that the state would tax them. See id. at 67.  Two of the
venues were unlicensed former racetracks; however, they must have received li-
15
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sidered a licensing, and licensing is one of the six specific actions
PASPA prohibits.132
The court consistently struggled to define the word “authorize”
and determine whether PASPA only permits organized betting
schemes.133  The word “authorize” means “[t]o empower; to find a
right or authority to act,” or “[t]o permit a thing to be done in the
future.”134  The court reasoned that a repeal would no longer make
sports gambling illegal or criminal, but it would not be an endorse-
ment from the government to immediately participate in sports
gambling.135  The 2014 Law went beyond removing the laws from
record; the 2014 Law “affirmatively permit[ted]” sports gambling in
certain venues. 136  The court rejected Appellants’ argument that
the 2014 Law did not violate PASPA because it did not promulgate
a “broad regulatory scheme,” one of the reasons the Third Circuit
cited in Christie I that the 2012 Law violated PASPA. 137  Ultimately,
the 2014 Law violated PASPA because PASPA prohibits any state au-
thorization of legalized sports gambling.138
The Third Circuit believed that PASPA’s constitutional issues
were resolved in Christie I; accordingly, Christie II also did not inter-
pret PASPA to require states to keep its existing sports betting laws,
which would allow New Jersey to completely repeal its laws prohibit-
ing sports gambling.139  Furthermore, the holding in Christie I —
censes within the past 15 years. See id. at 52–53 (discussing venues selected by 2014
Law).
132. See id. at 54 (arguing 2014 Law violates PASPA).
133. See id. at 34–35 (questioning definition of “authorize”).
134. See Christie II, 799 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 133 (6th ed. 1990)), vacated, reh’g en banc granted Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-
4569 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015)).
135. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Christie II, supra note 2, at 48 (providing
one Third Circuit judge’s definition of repeal).  While trying to figure out what
kind of repeal would be consistent with PASPA, the court compared the 2014 Law
to zoning laws: if it would be permissible to designate one area for certain property
but not another, the same may be allowed for sports gambling. See id. at 41–42
(questioning whether 2014 Law identifying specific venues necessarily violates
PASPA).
136. See id. at 31 (discussing practical effect of 2014 Law).  The Third Circuit
remained steadfast that by “selectively dictating where sports gambling may occur,
who may place bets in such gambling, and which athletic contests are permissible
subjects for such gambling,” constitutes an authorization of sports gambling.  Chris-
tie II, 799 F.3d at 266.
137. See Christie II, 799 F.3d at 267 (conceding differences between 2012 Law
and 2014 Law).
138. See id. (declaring 2014 Law authorizes sports gambling).
139. See Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees to Petitions for Rehearing and/
or Rehearing En Banc at 1–2, Christie II, 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-4546,
14-4568, 14-4569) [hereinafter New Jersey’s Response to Petition for Rehearing En
16
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that PASPA constitutionally does not violate the anti-comman-
deering doctrine — serves as the law of the Third Circuit.140
“Whatever else PASPA may allow a state to do, it certainly does not
allow a state to dictate where sports gambling may occur, by whom,
and even on what sporting events, under the guise of ‘partially re-
pealing’ its otherwise-blanket sports gambling prohibitions.”141
5. A Tail or a Leg: Judge Fuentes’ Dissent in Christie II
Christie II was accompanied by one dissenting opinion from
Judge Julio Fuentes, who accused the majority of “calling a tail a
leg—which, as the adage goes, does not make it so.”142  The dissent
argued that the majority’s analysis inappropriately equated authori-
zation with repeal.143  As the Third Circuit stated in Christie I, “the
lack of an affirmative prohibition of an activity does not mean it is
affirmatively authorized by law.”144  The 2014 Law did not give “ex-
plicit grant of permission for any entity to engage in sports
wagering.”145
The dissent further argued the majority opinion directly con-
tradicted the holding of Christie I by giving New Jersey “no choice at
all . . . [either to] uphold all prohibitions on sports wagering in
perpetuity or until PASPA is no more.”146  The dissent employed
the same reasoning as the New Jersey legislature when publishing
the bill for the 2014 Law: both the Third Circuit and the United
States agreed that New Jersey was free to repeal its prohibitions on
sports gambling “in whole or in part.”147  Furthermore, the dissent
Banc] (discussing choice PASPA leaves to states regarding sports gambling
prohibitions).
140. See Christie II, 799 F.3d at 263 (holding Christie I to be correct and bind-
ing on Third Circuit).
141. New Jersey’s Response to Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note
139, at 3.  The court believed that using similar language to PASPA only masked
the true fact that the 2014 Law still violated the federal statute. See Christie II, 799
F.3d at 267 (rejecting argument 2014 Law construction circumvents PASPA).  In-
cluding or excluding a word or phrase in statutory language cannot trump the
Supremacy Clause. See id. at 267 (rejecting 2014 Law’s construction circumvents
PASPA).
142. See Christie II, 799 F.3d at 272 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).  Interestingly,
Judge Fuentes wrote the majority opinion in the Third Circuit Appeal in Christie I
upholding that the 2012 Law violated PASPA. See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d
Cir. 2013), cert denied sub nom. Christie v. NCAA134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
143. See Christie II, 799 F.3d at 269 (discussing primary issue with majority
opinion).
144. See id. at 270 (quoting Christie I, 730 F.3d at 232).
145. Id.
146. See id. at 270–71.
147. See id. at 271.
17
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believes a complete repeal of sports wagering would be impossible,
because the state would violate PASPA if it issued a complete repeal
but attempted to enact age requirements for sports wagering.148
The dissent drew a comparison to the 2012 Law, which set out
a regulatory scheme to authorize sports betting in the state.149  The
2012 scheme violated PASPA, whereas the 2014 Law sets forth no
such scheme or state involvement.150  The majority’s confusion be-
tween repeal and authorization effectively makes any and all
prohibitions on sports wagering a violation of PASPA, and there-
fore unconstitutional.151
III. ANALYSIS
Two weeks after the Third Circuit published their opinion, the
New Jersey parties filed a motion for a rehearing of the case en
banc.152  The request argued that the Third Circuit opinion was in-
consistent with Christie I and that the case raised an issue of “excep-
tional importance, i.e., whether the federal government may
prescribe the manner in which a State may govern by requiring it to
maintain existing laws.”153  The Third Circuit opinion in Christie II,
the New Jersey parties argued, extended the reach of PASPA by
forcing the state to keep laws in place which they desired to re-
peal.154  The Third Circuit granted a rehearing en banc on October
14, 2015, vacating their judgment from Christie II.155  The Third Cir-
cuit did not discuss why they granted the rehearing or which issues
they will address en banc.156
148. See id. at 271 n.6 (postulating potential ramifications if complete repeal
of sports wagering prohibitions occurred).
149. See id. at 272 (arguing 2014 Law promulgates no such scheme).
150. See id. (comparing 2012 Law to 2014 Law).
151. See id. at 271 (reasoning that majority’s opinion is inconsistent with prior
case law on PASPA).
152. See Brent Johnson, Christie Asks for Rehearing in N.J.’s Sports Betting Battle,
NJ. COM (Sep. 8, 2015, 7:09 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/09/
christie_asks_for_re-hearing_in_njs_sports_betting_battle.html (discussing New
Jersey parties’ rehearing request).
153. Petition for Rehearing and/or Rehearing En Banc for Appellants Chris-
topher J. Christie, David L. Rebuck, and Frank Zanzuccki at iii, Christie II, 799 F.3d
259 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-4546) (arguing necessity for rehearing of Christie II).
154. See id. at 3–4 (contending PASPA commandeers states).
155. See Order Granting Rehearing En Banc, supra note 14 (granting rehear-
ing en banc of Christie II).
156. See id. (stating only rehearing was granted and no reasoning behind it).
Voting for an en banc hearing is “a procedural vote, not a vote on the merits.” See
Grange95, New Jersey Sports Betting En Banc Rehearing: Everything You Wanted to Know,
LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Oct. 26, 2015, 3:42 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.
com/5262/new-jersey-sports-betting-en-banc/. According to the Third Circuit’s in-
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A. The 2014 Law is Inconsistent with Christie I’s Interpretation
of PASPA
The language of the Third Circuit’s opinion in Christie I does
not support the New Jersey parties’ argument that PASPA would
allow for a partial repeal of state sports gambling prohibitions.157
In Christie I, the Third Circuit only discussed two options that fol-
lowed PASPA: having no law in place or keeping current sports
gambling prohibitions in place.158  The Christie I court discussed au-
thorization and repeal only in reference to PASPA not allowing a
complete repeal of state gambling prohibitions.159  In its conclusion
in Christie I, the Third Circuit summarized New Jersey’s options:
keep its laws, repeal them entirely, or wait for Congress to amend
or repeal PASPA.160  The only time a party mentioned a partial re-
peal was in the United States’ brief for petition of writ of certiorari
in Christie I.161  The United States later argued the language of “in
whole or in part” did not mean “that every partial repeal of a state’s
prior sports betting prohibitions will automatically satisfy PASPA, or
that a state’s legislature is free to enact any laws that it wishes re-
garding sports gambling as long as it takes care to frame them as
ternal policy, en banc hearings are granted only in “extraordinary” cases where
hearing by a full court is of “immediate importance.” INTERNAL OPERATING PROCE-
DURES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 9.2
(2015), available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/legacyfiles/2015_IOPs.pdf; see
also Grange95, supra (explaining possibility that en banc hearing was granted be-
cause sports gambling issue is significantly important that full court should hear
case).  Moreover, en banc hearings are generally not granted if the issue is the
application of the law to the facts of the case when the court’s statement of the law
is correct. See Internal Operating Procedures of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit § 9.3.2.  The court may ultimately affirm the District
Court’s decision but for different legal reasons. See Grange95, supra (predicting
outcome of en banc hearing).
157. See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 233 (3d Cir. 2013) (outlining only two options
under PASPA as maintaining sports wagering ban or completely repealing it), cert
denied sub nom. Christie v. NCAA134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
158. See id. at 232 (“Nothing in [PASPA] requires that the states keep any law in
place. All that is prohibited is the issuance of gambling ‘license[s]’ or the affirma-
tive ‘authoriz[ation] by law of gambling schemes. . . . We do not see how having no
law in place governing sports wagering is the same as authorizing it by law.”)
“PASPA gives states the choice of either implementing a ban on sports gambling or
of accepting complete deregulation of that field[.]” Id. at 235.
159. See New Jersey’s Response to Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note
139, at 8–9 (arguing rehearing en banc is unnecessary).
160. See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 240–41 (outlining two options PASPA gives to
states).
161. See New Jersey’s Response to Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note
139, at 8 (stating there is no mention of partial repeals in Christie I).
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‘partial repeals’ of existing prohibitions.”162  Perhaps New Jersey be-
came too reliant on this passage from the United States’ brief; the
New Jersey parties’ argument is weakened by the fact that the idea
of a partial repeal did not come directly from the Third Circuit.163
Christie I only explicitly grants a complete repeal of New
Jersey’s sports gambling prohibitions, which is the opposite of the
2014 Law’s effect.164  At first glance, it seems difficult to reconcile
the statement from Christie I that each state can decide what level of
police power to use against sports gambling “or what the exact con-
tours of the prohibition will be”; however, this seems to be the only
tacit suggestion of a partial repeal.165  The Christie I court reasoned
that PASPA only requires “states [to] enforce the laws they choose
to maintain,” which may seem to indicate that states can maintain
the prohibitions they leave in place.166
The Third Circuit’s reasoning is consistent from Christie I to
Christie II.167  This is apparent when analyzing the application of the
2014 Law in practice.168  The New Jersey parties would argue that
“because the lack of a prohibition on certain sports wagering” is not
affirmatively authorizing it by law, the 2014 Law is inconsistent with
the Third Circuit’s construction of PASPA in Christie I.169  Addition-
ally, restricting sports gambling to specific locations is the same as
permitting them in those listed locations.170  Therefore, although
162. Brief for United States as Amicus at 14, Christie II, 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir.
2015).
163. See New Jersey’s Response to Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note
139, at 8 (“Defendants tellingly cannot point to a single passage in Christie I even
alluding to the possibility of ‘partial repeals.’”).
164. See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 235 (“PASPA gives the states a choice of either
implementing a ban on sports gambling or of accepting a complete deregulation
of that field as per the federal standard.”).
165. Id. at 233.
166. See Joint Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Petition for Re-
hearing and/or Rehearing En Banc, Christie II, 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015) (Nos.
14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569) [hereinafter Joint Motion for Leave to File Reply in
Support of Petition for Rehearing and/or Rehearing En Banc].
167. See New Jersey’s Response to Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note
139, at 10 (arguing Third Circuit analysis of 2014 Law is correct).
168. See generally id. (arguing Third Circuit analysis of 2014 Law is correct).
169. See Joint Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Petition for Re-
hearing and/or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 166 (attempting to distinguish re-
peal from authorization).  It is suspect that New Jersey would limit sports gambling
to these specific racetracks and casinos, which require state licenses to operate. See
New Jersey’s Response to Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 139, at 12
(arguing 2014 Law authorizes state-sponsored sports gambling).
170. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Christie II, supra note 2, at 31; see also
Goodall, supra note 3, at 1133 (arguing 2014 Law likely violates PASPA by singling
out state regulated venues for betting).
20
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol23/iss2/4
2016] HANGING ON BY A “TAIL” 501
crafted as a repeal, the 2014 Law is an authorization by granting
some venues to take bets on sporting events and excluding
others.171
The Christie II dissent’s contention—that a complete repeal
would also be considered an authorization—is unfounded because
not having any regulation in place is different from having only cer-
tain limitations in place.172  “Indeed, Christie II only grudgingly ac-
knowledged that a total repeal may not violate PASPA, saying it
would be ‘hard-pressed, given Christie I,’ to find that a full repeal is
‘authorizing by law.’”173
B. “That horse has left the barn”:174 Revisiting the
Constitutionality of PASPA from Christie I
At oral argument of Christie II in the Third Circuit, the judges
seemed to disagree whether Christie I definitively resolved the con-
stitutional issues of PASPA.175  However, at the conclusion of this
oral argument, the court decided that Christie I should be binding
upon the Third Circuit.176  Although the Third Circuit stated Chris-
tie I is “in play” during the rehearing en banc, it is unclear whether
the court will address these issues in the en banc opinion.177  How-
ever, ignoring the constitutional issues of PASPA may prove to be
problematic.178
171. See Christie II, 799 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting statutory lan-
guage as exemption from PASPA), vacated, reh’g en banc granted Nos. 14-4546, 14-
4568, 14-4569 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
172. See Jeannie O’Sullivan, “Rematch Possible in Fight Over NJ Sports Bet-
ting Law,” LAW 360 (Aug. 25, 2015), available at http://www.blankrome.com/in-
dex.cfm?contentID=31&itemID=3493 (quoting attorney Eric G. Fikry as stating,
“The dissent contends that if a partial repeal of prohibitions on sports wagering is
construed as an authorization, then a complete repeal ‘must be considered author-
ization by law . . . .  This point seems problematic, as the complete absence of any
regulation whatsoever does seem to be qualitatively different than the selective
restriction of an activity to certain locations.”).
173. See Joint Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Petition for Re-
hearing and/or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 166, at 7 (arguing Third Circuit
would not be satisfied with any state regulation after complete repeal).
174. Transcript of Oral Argument, Christie II, supra note 2, at 13 (insinuating
that chance to address constitutional issues of PASPA passed when Third Circuit
did not grant rehearing en banc of Christie I).
175. See id. (“Maybe we should clarify what Christie I says.”).
176. See Christie II, 799 F.3d at 263.
177. See Rehearing En Banc Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 12:22 (“Christie I is
now in play because we’re sitting en banc.”).
178. See Joint Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Petition for Re-
hearing and/or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 166 at 2 (“Christie II treated as
settled and binding Christie I’s holding that PASPA is constitutional, while erasing
the Christie I majority’s basis for reaching that holding.”).
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1. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
Given the Supreme Court’s evolving definition of the anti-com-
mandeering doctrine, PASPA does not violate the Tenth Amend-
ment.179  Congress has the power to regulate sports gambling;
therefore, PASPA’s preemption of the field is constitutional.180
Specifically, in F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that a statute does not commandeer the states if it requires
states merely to consider federal regulations.181  The statute at issue
in F.E.R.C. allowed states to regulate utilities according to the fed-
eral program or not regulate them at all, similar to PASPA’s two
options regarding sports gambling prohibitions.182  Ultimately,
PASPA is constitutional because it does not require states to enact a
legislative program.183
2. Equal Sovereignty
Critics of Christie I are unconvinced that PASPA is consistent
with the equal sovereignty principle; moreover, they are unsure
whether courts have actually defined the equal sovereignty princi-
ple.184  Specifically, the motives behind PASPA’s grandfathering
provision, preventing the corruption of sports and youth, does not
relate to society today, much like the Voting Rights Act coverage
179. See Goodall, supra note 3, at 1130 (predicting Third Circuit would find
PASPA in compliance with Tenth Amendment in Christie II).
180. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1982) (explaining Su-
preme Court precedent allows Congressional discretion in regulating activities
which they may preempt).  For a discussion on sports wagering as a field that can
be regulated by Congress, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
181. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 764 (explaining statute at issue does not comman-
deer states).
182. Compare id. at 764 (“[I]f a State has no utilities commission, or simply
stops regulating in the field, it need not even entertain the federal proposals”),
with Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 235 (3d Cir. 2013) (“PASPA gives states the choice of
either implementing a ban on sports gambling or of accepting complete deregula-
tion of that field[.]”), cert. denied sub nom. Christie v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
183. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981) (holding statute does not commandeer states because it does not
require them to enforce federal regulatory program); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997) (“We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program . . . nor command the States’ of-
ficers . . . to enforce a federal regulatory program”).
184. See Justin Willis McKithen, Note, Playing Favorites: Congress’ Denial of Equal
Sovereignty to the States in the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 49 GA. L.
REV. 539, 540 (2015) (arguing PASPA’s grandfathering provision favors states such
as Nevada and Delaware, violating equal sovereignty); Goodall, supra note 3, at
1131 (arguing Shelby County is unclear whether its equal sovereignty analysis is lim-
ited to facts of that case); Abigail B. Molitor, Comment, Understanding Equal Sover-
eignty, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1839, 1879 (2014) (arguing recent case law, including
Christie I, offers potentially contradicting ideas of scope of equal sovereignty).
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formula at issue in Shelby County became irrelevant after its crea-
tion.185  Congress has a right to protect the moral fiber of profes-
sional and amateur sports by prohibiting state-sponsored sports
gambling, but then allowing some state-sponsored sports gambling
is contradictory.186
New Jersey legislators were left confused after Christie II and felt
they had “no guidance to ascertain what is left of their sovereignty
vis-a`-vis the federal government.”187  After Christie II, there seem to
be only two options for New Jersey: to maintain its existing laws or
to repeal them entirely.188  At oral argument for Christie II, the
court seemed to agree with this possibility: one way for New Jersey
to get around PASPA is to not mention any venues in its law; in
essence, a complete repeal.189  While some believe this goes beyond
what the Constitution permits, the court in Christie I felt confident
that the Supreme Court precedent recognized that “Congress may
treat states differently under its power to regulate interstate
commerce.”190
The fact remains that PASPA gives some states, like Nevada,
rights that other states do not currently possess.191  PASPA leaves
forty-six states, including New Jersey, without any opportunity to
profit from legalized sports gambling. 192  The Supreme Court
seem unwilling to address PASPA’s constitutionality, as its denial of
185. See McKithen, supra note 184, at 541 (arguing preclusion of forty-six
states from sports gambling does not reflect today’s standards).  However, the First
Circuit has employed Christie I’s analysis to hold that a state’s right to participate in
a federal health insurance program, like a state’s right to regulate sports gambling,
“is not a core sovereign state function” like regulating elections. See Mayhew v.
Burwell, 772 F.3d 80, 95–96 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding provision of Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act compliant with equal sovereignty).
186. See McKithen, supra note 184, at 562 (“Congress may claim that PASPA
was intended to protect the sanctity of sports, but if sports wagering were truly
imposing of a threat, it would make little sense to allow the enterprise anywhere at
all.”).
187. Joint Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Petition for Rehearing
and/or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 166, at 2.
188. See id. (explaining Third Circuit interpretation of constitutional options
PASPA provides).
189. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Christie II, supra note 2, at 49 (discuss-
ing what state statutory construction of sports gambling law would satisfy PASPA).
190. See NCAA, Pro Leagues Urge Supreme Court to Reject Petition Over N.J. Sports
Gambling Law, 26 No. 5 WESTLAW J. ENT. INDUS. 3 (2014) (summarizing govern-
ment’s arguments to affirm Christie I district court ruling).
191. See Noah Feldman, Sports Gambling Law is Unfair to New Jersey, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (Aug. 28, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-08-
28/sports-gambling-law-is-unfair-to-new-jersey (explaining potential constitutional
issues of PASPA).
192. See McKithen, supra note 184, at 543 (arguing PASPA violates equal
sovereignty).
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certiorari to Christie I guarantees Nevada’s monopoly over legalized
sports gambling in the nation.193
IV. NEXT STEPS FOR NEW JERSEY
While legalizing sports gambling is an issue of immediate im-
portance to the state of New Jersey, the Third Circuit will unlikely
uphold the 2014 Law.194  Despite hearing arguments regarding the
constitutionality of PASPA at the rehearing en banc, there is a possi-
bility that the Third Circuit will analyze only the text of the 2014
Law.195  Unless the court chooses to question PASPA’s constitution-
ality, the fact that the 2014 Law limits gambling to state-licensed
venues and calls for a partial, not complete, repeal almost certainly
guarantees that it is inconsistent with PASPA.196
Whatever the Third Circuit rules on the rehearing, there is a
significant chance that the losing party will appeal to the Supreme
Court; however, given the Court’s past refusal to hear Christie I, it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court would hear the case.197  If the
Third Circuit rules in favor of New Jersey, sports betting could com-
mence immediately at the racetracks and casinos specified by the
2014 Law.198  In this case, the Sports Leagues could request that the
Supreme Court stay the Third Circuit’s ruling, which would halt
any sports betting from occurring until the Supreme Court ruled
on the issue.199
“While New Jersey is at the forefront of this movement [to le-
galize sports gambling], many states around the country appear
poised to join should New Jersey provide a roadmap around
193. See McKithen, supra note 184, at 542 (arguing PASPA violates equal
sovereignty).
194. See Casey C. Sullivan, New Jersey Loses Gamble on Legalized Sports Betting,
Again, FINDLAW 3RD CIRCUIT NEWS & INFORMATION BLOG (Sept. 11, 2015, 5:59 AM),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/third_circuit/2015/09/new-jersey-loses-gamble-on-le
galized-sports-betting-again.html (suggesting New Jersey propose new legislation to
get around PASPA).
195. See New Jersey’s Response to Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note
139, at 11–12 (stating Christie II does not reopen any constitutional issues regard-
ing PASPA).
196. See NCAA, 61 F.Supp.3d 488, 492 (D.N.J. 2014) (recommending repeal
of PASPA as option for New Jersey), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Gov. of N.J., 799 F.3d
259 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated, reh’g en banc granted Nos. 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569 (3d
Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
197. See Dustin Gouker, New Life for New Jersey Sports Betting Case: Rehearing
Granted by Court, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Oct. 14, 2015, 7:09 PM), http://
www.legalsportsreport.com/4987/nj-sports-betting-case/ (predicting future of
litigation).
198. See id. (predicting gambling activity in New Jersey if 2014 Law).
199. See id. (predicting future of litigation).
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PASPA.”200  Mere weeks after the Third Circuit published the Chris-
tie II opinion, and only days after New Jersey filed for rehearing en
banc, California introduced a sports wagering bill, effective only if
both PASPA and California’s state constitution are amended to al-
low sports betting in California.201  The California bill would allow
existing casinos, racetracks, and card rooms to authorize gambling
to those over twenty-one years of age, and licensees would have to
pay a percentage of winnings to the state.202  In addition to Califor-
nia, six states have discussed enacting sports betting bills in 2015.203
New Jersey officials continue to insist legalized sports betting will
generate millions of dollars in revenue for the state, despite the
millions of dollars taxpayers have already paid in legal fees through-
out both sets of litigation.204
However, the 2014 Law was not a successful roadmap to legaliz-
ing sports gambling within a state.205  Had New Jersey prevailed, or
if New Jersey prevails in the future, other states will likely follow and
begin legalizing sports gambling.206  One study showed that Ameri-
cans will bet $95 billion, mostly illegally, on NFL and college foot-
ball in the 2015-2016 season.207  The president and CEO of the
American Gaming Association declared that the “federal ban on
traditional sports betting outside of Nevada is failing.”208
The District Court for the District of New Jersey and the Third
Circuit have consistently stated that the only path to legalized sports
200. NCAA, 61 F.Supp.3d at 492; see also David Purdum, Research Shows U.S.
Could Dominate Global Legalized Sports Betting Market, ESPN (Sept. 9, 2015), http://
espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/13614240/research-shows-united-states-dominate-
global-legalized-sports-betting-market (detailing seven states that proposed sports
betting bills similar to New Jersey in 2015).
201. See Dustin Gouker, California Eyes Legalized Sports Betting, Introduces New
Bill, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Sep. 11, 2015, 8:47 P.M.), http://www.legalsportsre-
port.com/3757/california-eyes-legalized-sports-betting/ (providing overview of
California bill).
202. See id. (reviewing proposed provisions of California bill).
203. See Purdum, supra note 200 (arguing state-sponsored sports gambling is
of national interest).
204. See Johnson, supra note 152 (predicting whether officials will file rehear-
ing en banc).
205. See id.
206. See Michael McCann, Analyzing the Future of New Jersey Sports Betting After
Denied Appeal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.si.com/more-
sports/2015/08/25/new-jersey-sports-betting-appeal-denied (discussing nation-
wide interest in legalizing sports gambling).
207. See Purdum, supra note 200.
208. See id. (quoting Geoff Freeman, President and CEO of American Gaming
Association).
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betting is through a Congressional repeal or PASPA amendment.209
Many believe Congress will approve legalized sports gambling in
the future.210  State senators, including John McCain of Arizona
and Roderick D. Wright of California, have expressed their
support.211
Cooperation between the states and the Sports Leagues would
also create a smoother path to legalized sports gambling.212  Adam
Silver, commissioner of the NBA, has publicly declared his support
for repealing PASPA and creating a regulated system of legalized
sports gambling.213  He believes that Americans have changed their
attitude since PASPA’s enactment and that sports gambling “has in-
creasingly become a popular and accepted form of entertain-
ment.”214  Furthermore, sports fans are demanding a secure and
legal way to bet on sports.215  David Stern, former NBA Commis-
sioner, agrees with Silver that sports gambling should be under fed-
eral regulation that would allow for protection of leagues’
intellectual property and provide a channel to monitor illegal bet-
ting.216  Yet, he is wary of New Jersey’s efforts to legalize sports bet-
ting, calling the 2014 Law “ham-handed” and stating that it would
“cause people to bet their grocery money on gambling.”217
209. See NCAA, 61 F.Supp.3d 488, 492 (D.N.J. 2014) (reiterating that court’s
role does not involve questioning congressional intent), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v.
Gov. of N.J., 799 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated, reh’g en banc granted Nos. 14-
4546, 14-4568, 14-4569 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
210. See Jeff Ifrah, Wanted: A Quarterback for Legalization of U.S. Sports Betting,
LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Aug. 11, 2015, 12:16 P.M.) http://www.legalsportsreport.
com/3022/sports-betting-legalization-push-needs-leader/ (arguing legalized sports
gambling is in America’s immediate future).
211. See id. (providing evidence that favoring legalized sports gambling is
growing trend); Should Sports Betting Be Legal? U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://
www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-sports-betting-be-legal (last visited Apr. 10,
2016) (providing list of arguments for and against legalizing sports gambling from
politicians and sports industry professionals).
212. See Goodall, supra note 3, at 1133 (arguing Sports Leagues’ support is
crucial and 2014 Law alienates them).
213. See Adam Silver, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13,
2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-
silver-legalize-sports-betting.html?_r=1 (urging formation of new regulatory system
while maintaining integrity of sports).
214. See id.
215. See id. (supporting repeal of PASPA in favor of new scheme).
216. See John Brennan, Former NBA Commissioner: Time has Come for Legal Sports
Betting, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Oct. 1, 2015, 6:26 PM), http://www.northjersey.com/
news/former-nba-commissioner-time-has-come-for-legal-sports-betting-1.1423270
(summarizing Stern’s opinion that cooperation between professional sports
leagues and the federal government would be profitable).
217. See id.
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As New Jersey awaits the Third Circuit’s response, legislators
are continuing to find ways to call attention to the climate sur-
rounding sports gambling in America.218  New Jersey will continue
to fight for legalized gambling within the state.219  This may require
a new state law completely repealing New Jersey’s sports betting
laws (and inevitably a new set of litigation), or a serious push for
Congress to change or repeal PASPA.220  New Jersey legislators re-
main committed to not only “New Jersey being treated fairly under
federal law, but [also] the common sense reality of bringing a
sports wagering industry that is already taking place every day in
our state out of the shadows.”221
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the Third Circuit’s decision en banc, New Jersey
will likely be unable to take its victory lap around the sports gam-
bling racetrack anytime soon.222  New Jersey would have a better
chance of success if the Third Circuit called into question the con-
stitutional analysis of PASPA in Christie I.223  However, if the Third
Circuit leaves the holding of Christie I untouched, New Jersey is un-
likely to prevail because of the apparent level of state involvement
that the 2014 Law seems to promulgate.224  New Jersey remains
dedicated to legalizing sports gambling in the state, and with many
other states in the nation watching, the issues of reforming PASPA
218. See, e.g., As New Jersey Sports Betting Court Case Inches Along, Congressmen
Pursue Legislative Path, FOX BUSINESS (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.foxbusiness.com
/markets/2015/09/21/as-new-jersey-sports-betting-court-case-inches-along-con
gressmen-pursue/ (describing New Jersey legislators’ actions).  New Jersey repre-
sentative Frank Pallone has requested that the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce investigate the role of professional sports leagues in fantasy sports gambling.
See id. Many see PASPA as the “guarantor” of Nevada’s monopoly in sports gam-
bling in America. See Feldman, supra note 191 (explaining potential constitutional
issues of PASPA).
219. See Joe Drape, New Jersey’s Effort to Legalize Sports Betting is Denied on Appeal,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/sports/foot
ball/new-jerseys-effort-to-legalize-sports-betting-is-denied-on-appeal.html?_r=0
(quoting Joe Asher, president of bookkeeping service William Hill U.S.).  “It’s
pretty clear to me that this matter is far from over. . . . I remain convinced that
legal sports betting will come to New Jersey.  It’s a matter of when, not if.” Id.
(quoting Joe Asher).
220. See Feldman, supra note 191 (“Unless a state can convince Congress to
change the law, it’s stuck without sports gambling.”).
221. See Johnson, supra note 152 (quoting Brian Murray, Spokesman for Of-
fice of New Jersey Governor Chris Christie).
222. See supra notes 194–221 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 152–93 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 152–93 and accompanying text.
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and instituting legalized state sports gambling will not remain con-
tained primarily within the Third Circuit for much longer.225
Amelia Curotto*
225. See supra notes 194–221 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law, 2017;
B.A., Providence College, 2011.
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